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VOL. 108 DECEMBER 29, 2008 PAGES 50-57
EMOTIONAL ADAPTATION AND LAWSUIT
SETTLEMENTS
Peter H. Huang*
In Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, Professors
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur note an
unexplored aspect of protracted lawsuits: During prolonged litigation
tort victims can adapt emotionally to even permanent injuries, and
therefore are more likely to settle-and for less-than if their lawsuits
proceeded faster.' This Response demonstrates that this is a facile
application of hedonic adaptation with the following three points. First,
people care about more than happiness: Tort victims may sue to seek
justice or revenge; emotions in tort litigation can be cultural
evaluations;' and people are often motivated by identity and meaning.'
Also, if plaintiffs fear losing litigation options,4 they are less likely to
settle-and for more-than if their lawsuits proceeded faster. Second,
adaptation can be slow and remain incomplete after many years. Third,
fostering emotional adaptation by lengthy tort litigation raises ethical
and normative questions.
* Harold E. Kohn Chair Professor of Law, Temple University. Thanks to Leo Katz
for helpful comments. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, Dave Hoffman, Paul
Litton, Amanda Pustilnik, Rick Swedloff, Christina Wells, and students in a Law,
Emotions, & Neuroscience seminar and a Law & Human Behavior Colloquium provided
clarifying discussions. Special thanks to my six-and-one-half-year-old niece Kelly because
she helped her Uncle Peter appreciate the benefits of thinking about happier times if
people are mad or upset about something beyond their control.
1. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Hedonic Adaptation
and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1516, 1536-40 (2008).
2. Peter H. Huang, Response, Diverse Conceptions of Emotions in Risk Regulation,
156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 435, 447 (2008), at
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/03-2008/Huang.pdf.
3. See George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of
Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. Pub. Econ. 1795, 1801-04 (2008)
(arguing that "experience utility fails to capture a wide range of dimensions of existence
that people deeply and legitimately care about").
4. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation:
A Real Options Perspective, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1267, 1275-80 (2006) (introducing real
options model to analyze litigant behavior).
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I. HAPPINESS Is NOT EVERYTHING
Naturally, individuals desire happiness; but most people, especially
litigation parties, care about emotions other than happiness and care
about things other than emotions. Emotions other than unhappiness
that drive plaintiffs to file lawsuits include anger, disappointment,
outrage, shock, and surprise. The language of tort litigation also
involves more than just happiness and unhappiness. Torts entail
contested notions of blameworthiness, efficiency, equity, fairness, justice,
morality, and responsibility. These value-laden concepts typically move
parties emotionally.5 Tort victims motivated by these emotions will
continue litigation even if they experience complete hedonic adaptation.
Litigation itself also generates usually negative affect.' As with
divorce and child custody battles, tort lawsuits can become unpleasant,
with each side determined to emotionally harass the other. Parties can
end up in a vicious cycle of aggressive litigation behavior: Litigation
causes negative affect, leading to more aggressive litigation behavior that
causes further negative affect, and so forth. Further, most people seek
meaning in their life narratives. Tort victims who do not sue may be
viewed as weak by others. Individuals usually care about what others
think and do not like to appear weak. Indeed, many also derive pleasure
from reliving memories of being courageous.
Perhaps most importantly, people care about features of life other
than affect. An empirical survey found that childcare was only
marginally more enjoyable than housework, working, and commuting,
and less enjoyable than eleven other daily activities. 7 There are two ways
to interpret such data. First, people mistakenly become parents, not
realizing that kids reduce average happiness. Second, people become
parents to experience meaning and satisfaction from caring for another.
Objective "happiness" does not capture such valued experiences.
Finally, lawsuits involve real options:' Plaintiffs have unilateral
options to drop lawsuits, and litigants have bilateral options to settle.
5. In the movies A Civil Action and Ein Brockovich, foi example, tort victins care more
about receiving apologies than money. A Civil Action (Paramount Pictures 1998); Erin
Brockovich (Universal Pictures 2000).
6. Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 Int'l Rev. L.
& Econ. 31, 32-33 (1992).
7. Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life
Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method, 306 Science 1776, 1777 tbl.1 (2004)
[hereinafter Kahneman, Survey Method].
8. See Dylan M. Smith et al., Are Subjective Well-Being Measures Any Better Than
Decision Utility Measures?, 3 Health Econ. Pol'y & L. 85, 89 (2008) [hereinafter Smith et
al., Subjective Well-Being Measures].
9. See Grindfest & Huang, supra note 4, at 1275-80 (applying real options theory in
context of litigation); Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of
Attorneys' Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1943, 1952-58 (1998)
(same).
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Litigation options are like financial options in that an option with more
time before its expiration is more valuable than an option with less
time. 1 Therefore, fear of losing options motivates people to spend
effort and money to preserve options that they may not otherwise value."
If plaintiffs desire to preserve litigation options, they will be less likely to
settle than if their lawsuits proceeded faster. This contradicts the
conclusion that the Essay reaches under different assumptions and so
highlights the importance of empirically verifying the descriptive
accuracy of such assumptions.
In sum, happiness and unhappiness do not capture all human
motivations. In litigation specifically, there are many practical reasons
besides unhappiness for why plaintiffs choose to sue, and for these other
motivations, hedonic adaptation is generally irrelevant.
II. SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT HEDONIC ADAPTATION
A version of the "hedonic treadmill" model first appeared in 1971,
but recent empirical data has necessitated important revisions of that
original model." First, people differ in their hedonic adaptation to
events. Second, hedonic set points differ across people and depend
partly upon individual temperaments." Third, people have slightly
positive, as opposed to neutral, hedonic set points. Fourth, one person
can have several hedonic set points for different components of well-
being that move in different directions. Fifth, minor events can lastingly
increase life satisfaction.* Sixth, an event can permanently alter hedonic
set points.
As to the last point, there is evidence that long-term disability
10. Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BellJ. Econ. & Mgmt.
Sci. 141, 142-43 (1973) (developing financial options theory).
11. See Jiwoong Shin & Dan Ariely, Keeping Doors Open: The Effect of
Unavailability on Incentives to Keep Options Viable, 50 Mgmt. Sci. 575, 584 (2004)
("[T]he experimental evidence presented suggests that individuals value options in a way
that is different from expected value of these options, and in particular, that decision
makers overvalue their options and are willing to overinvest to keep these options from
disappearing.").
12. See Philip Brickman & Donald T. Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning
the Good Society, in Adaptation-Level Theory: A Symposium 287, 289, 299-300 (M. H.
Appley ed., 1971).
13. See Ed Diener et al., Beyond the Hedonic Treadmill: Revising the Adaptation
Theory of Well-Being, 61 Am. Psychol. 305, 312 (2006).
14. A person's hedonic set point is a stable happiness level that a person tends back
towards after temporary experiences of elation or irritation.
15. See Daniel Mochon et al., Getting off the Hedonic Treadmill, One Step at a
Time: The Impact of Regular Religious Practice and Exercise on Well-Being, 29J. Econ.
Psychol. 632, 635 (2008) (suggesting that "cumulative impact of repeating minor but
positive life events in the short term . . . may be sufficient to increase well-being in the
long-term").
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permanently lowers hedonic set points." In addition, even if adaptation
occurs, it can remain incomplete. The Essay argues that a recent
longitudinal study" provides "substantial evidence that hedonic
adaptation to disability is significant." That study, however, found only
"approximately fifty percent adaptation to moderate disability and thirty
percent adaptation to severe disability."' " While reasonable people can
quibble over whether fifty percent adaptation is more like a glass being
half full or half empty, thirty percent adaptation is indisputably akin to a
glass being seventy percent empty. As a recent book describes, hedonic
adaptation has its limits."'
Psychologist and economics Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman, who
pioneered research to devise a measure of experienced happiness,
recently stated:
Ten years ago the generally accepted position was that there is
considerable hedonic adaptation to life conditions....
Evidence that people adapt-though not completely-to
becoming paraplegic or winning the lottery supported the idea
of a "hedonic treadmill" .... [I] t is rare for a hypothesis to be
so thoroughly falsified. . . . [A]lthough I still find the idea of an
aspiration treadmill attractive, I had to give it up.... We have
been wrong and now we know it. I suppose this means that
there is a science of well-being, even if we are not doing it very
well."
Two psychologists recently proposed a model of emotional
adaptation summarized by the acronym AREA: People Attend to self-
relevant unexplained events, React emotionally to such events, Explain or
come to understand them, and thus Adapt in the sense that they attend
less and experience weaker emotional reactions to those events.23 If this
model is correct, the march of time is not why a tort victim will adapt
hedonically to an injury. Instead, this model suggests tort victims will
adapt emotionally to injuries after they explain and understand how and
16. See Richard E. Lucas, Long-Term Disability Is Associated with Lasting Changes in
Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Two Nationally Representative Longitudinal
Studies, 92J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 717, 726 (2007).
17. Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A
Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, 92 J. Pub.
Econ. 1061 (2008).
18. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 1, at 1529.
19. Id.
20. Ed Diener & Robert Biswas-Diener, Happiness: Unlocking the Mysteries of
Psychological Wealth 151-61 (2008) (citing studies to illustrate ways in which hedonic
adaptation is limited).
21. Kahnernan, Survey Method, supra note 7.
22. Daniel Kahnernan, The Sad Tale of the Aspiration Treadmill, Edge World
Question Center (2008), at http://www.edge.oig/q2008/qO8_17.html#kahnenan (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
23. Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Explaining Away: A Model of Affective
Adaptation, 3 Persp. Psychol. Sci. 370, 370 (2008).
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why they were injured.
Another set of problems with hedonic adaptation involve the
difficulties in measuring happiness. Happiness involves both
experienced feelings and cognitive evaluations. Happiness measures
reflect an illusion of numerical objectivity, but in reality happiness
involves qualitative and subjective value judgments." Therefore,
measuring happiness with a number requires collapsing a multi-
dimensional rich notion into a necessarily impoverished one-
dimensional ranking. Moreover, people interpret the same question
about happiness differently depending on their age, culture, ethnicity,
gender, geographical region, language, situation, and time. People may
also desire to appear happy but not too happy. Research finds that self-
reported happiness is affected by framing," and people can lie to both
others and themselves about happiness.
The hedonic adaptation literature consists of two related but
distinct claims. First, people tend to adapt hedonically. This tendency
of emotional reactions to diminish over time is highly functional. To
ignore current events, by ruminating over ancient misfortune or
celebrating past good fortune, is not adaptive. As economics Nobel
Laureate Herbert Simon observed, emotions interrupt our attention to
focus on real-time priorities that demand our attention.2 6 If hedonic
adaptation is substantial, then any happiness is only temporary. But,
then again, so is life! As macroeconomist John Maynard Keynes
famously once said, "[T]he long run is a misleading guide to current
affairs. In the long run we are all dead."2 7 This quote also highlights that
whatever emotional adaptation there ultimately is, it will not be
immediate.
Second, while people can forecast accurately the valence of
emotions, people routinely and systematically overestimate the duration
and intensity of emotions." This has been labeled duration bias,
focusing illusion, or impact bias. But such inaccurate affective forecasts
motivate people to strive to achieve desirable outcomes and to avoid
aversive ones. If tort victims forecast complete hedonic adaptation, they
would not sue since lawsuits would have no lasting affect.
Emotions are fleeting and should be. But, while feeling emotions,
24. Mariano Torras, Subjectivity Inherent in Objective Measures of Well-Being, 9J.
Happiness Stud. 475, 476 (2008).
25. Rick Swedloff, Accounting for Happiness in Civil Settlements, 108 Colum. L. Rev.
Sidebar 39, 43-44 (2008), http://wwy.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/
108/39_Swedloff.pdf.
26. Herbert A. Simon, Motivational and Emotional Controls of Cognition, 74
Psychol. Rev. 29, 34 (1967).
27. John Maynard Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923), reprinted in 4 The
Collected Writings ofJohn Maynard Keynes 65 (Royal Econ. Soc'y ed., 1971).
28. Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness 107-19, 230-32 (2006); Diener & Biswas-
Diener, supra note 20, at 165-81.
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people can engage in behavior that is costly to reverse or even
irreversible. For example, severely depressed people may commit
suicide even if they would have adapted to what they were depressed
about given enough time. If people believed they would completely
hedonically adapt to most events, they would neither do anything
desirable nor avoid doing anything undesirable because nothing would
have much impact on their long-run happiness.
III. ETHICAL AND NORMATIVE QUESTIONS
If there is hedonic adaptation because of litigation delay, at least five
complex ethical questions follow-none of which the Essay fully
addresses." First, are attorneys breaching ethical or professional
responsibility norms if they continually remind plaintiffs of pain and
suffering to pursue greater monetary recovery? Second, should
plaintiffs' lawyers promote monetary or emotional recovery? Third, if
plaintiffs' attorneys come to learn from their past clients that former
plaintiffs are not as happy as those plaintiffs had expected after
protracted litigation, even if they receive a lot of money, should attorneys
disclose this to future clients? Fourth, should defense attorneys make
pretrial strategy choices to facilitate plaintiffs' hedonic adaptation to
reduce settlement demands? Fifth, should plaintiffs' attorneys engage in
trial behavior that exacerbates judges' and juries' overestimation of the
duration and intensity of negative affect from severe injuries?
Societies must also answer the normative question of whether a
greater probability of settlements versus trials is socially desirable. Trials
provide several public goods, including precedent and public judgment
amounts. Even if society decides that settlements are more desirable
than trials, relying on extended litigation to encourage settlements
generates emotional costs. Negative affect generated by extended
litigation is not only limited to parties, their attorneys, judges, and juries,
but likely spills over to families and friends.
Finally, society must answer two unresolved empirical questions.
First, does a higher likelihood of settlement justify such emotional costs?
Reasonable people may differ over the answer. Moreover, emotional
costs of protracted litigation are imposed unequally on different
subgroups in society. So not only the size, but also the distribution, of
emotional costs across people matter.
Second, can an increased probability of settlement be realized at
lower emotional costs? That depends on why tort victims file lawsuits. If
tort victims desire vengeance, self-punishments by defendants produce
settlements. If tort victims want information about what happened,
providing that produces settlements. If tort victims crave justice, sincere
29. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 1, at 1536-40.
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apologies by defendants produce settlements.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A desire to apply rapidly developing happiness research to analyze
law is laudable,"o but applications must acknowledge current lively
debates over the foundations of happiness research' and the
perspectives of eudaimonia versus hedonics. 2  Data reveal that those
with chronic health conditions exhibit what one law professor terms a
reverse endowment effect," in the sense that colostomy and kidney
dialysis patients report willingness to pay a lot of money or give up much
of a healthy life span to no longer suffer from undesirable medical
conditions. 4 So in spite of the happiness that patients with chronic
health conditions report, those patients reveal a willingness to forgo
much time or money to be healthy again. Inconsistencies between
revealed preferences versus experienced happiness raise questions about
which to rely upon. There is certain to be refinement in our
measurement and understanding of happiness. 3
Even were protracted lawsuits to allow some tort victims
opportunities to adapt somewhat emotionally to serious injuries, there
are better ways than prolonged litigation to foster hedonic adaptation.
Happiness research provides empirical data supporting a dozen activities
that raise happiness. - Further, even were there indisputable data that
30. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, Replacing Too Narrow "Rationality"
Premises in Employment Law: How Behavioral & Happiness Research Actually Can Be
Useful (Nov. 27, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review);
Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Happiness, Tort Damages, and Juries (Nov. 28, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
31. See, e.g., Paul Dolan, Developing Methods That Really Do Value the 'Q' in the
QALY, 3 Health Econ. Pol'y & L. 69, 74-75 (2008) (discussing problems with subjective
well-being ratings); Smith et al., Subjective W"ell-Being Measures, supra note 8, at 87-88
(discussing value of subjective well-being measures in relation to decision-based utility
measures).
32. See Alan S. Waterman, Reconsidering Happiness: A Eudaimonist's Perspective, 3
J. Positive Psychol. 234, 234 (2008) (analyzing hedonia and eudaimonia as related but
distinct conceptions of happiness, and suggesting how empirical research can be
strengthened in light of multiple conceptualizations about happiness).
33. Telephone Interview with Leo Katz, Frank Carano Professor of Law, Univ. Pa.
Law Sch. (Sept. 18, 2008).
34. Dylan M. Smith et al., Misremembering Colostonies? Former Patients Give
Lower Utility Ratings Than Do Current Patients, 25 Health Psychol. 688, 691 (2006);
George W. Torrance, Toward a Utility Theory Framework foi Health Status Index Models,
11 Health Services Res. 349, 355-364 (1976).
35. See Yew-Kwang Ng, Happiness Studies: Ways to Improve Comparability and
Some Public Policy Implications, 84 Econ. Rec. 253, 261-262 (2008) (advocating
increased public spending and brain stimulation to increase overall happiness).
36. See generally Sonja Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness: A Scientific Approach
to Getting the Life You Want (2007) (analyzing different activities that people can engage
in to become lastingly happier).
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substantial hedonic adaptation to physical injuries causes more
settlements, we should not evaluate civil procedure based solely upon
such data. It would run counter to most public values to avoid engaging
in tort reform on the grounds that drawn-out lawsuits permit emotional
adaptation to severe injuries.
Preferred Citation: Peter H. Huang, Emotional Adaptation and Lawsuit
Settlements, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 50 (2008),
http://www.colurmbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/ 108/50_Huang.pdf
